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The tendency to perceive art either in extra-aesthetic or pre-aesthetic fashion . . . is not only a barbaric 
residue or a danger of regressive consciousness. Something in art calls for this response. Art perceived 
strictly aesthetically is art aesthetically misperceived. 
—Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 
Introduction: The Philistine Moment of Contemporary Decolonial Activism in 
South Africa 
Since March 2015, South Africa has witnessed a resurgence of passionate decolonial struggles 
spearheaded by students at tertiary institutions of learning. One of the most remarkable and 
exciting aspects of the latter is no doubt the central role occupied by radical forms of cultural 
politics. In fact, student protests were ignited by an extreme act of cultural contestation, namely, 
the throwing of human excrement at the statue of nineteenth-century imperialist Cecil John 
Rhodes at the University of Capetown (UCT) by student activist Chumani Maxwele. 
Thenceforth, politicization and contestation of cultural objects from the colonial and apartheid 
eras—public monuments, statues, artworks, architecture—have functioned as key instigators and 
drivers of protests. In line with its inaugural manifestation, this radical cultural politics is often 
referred to as the Rhodes Must Fall (RMF) campaign or movement. 
Since then, the front line of struggles has broadened to include many other burning student 
issues, such as free access to tertiary education, institutional racism, transformation of university 
curricula, and representativity of staff composition, to name but a few. Many commentators have 
welcomed this shift away from “merely” cultural matters, symbolic acts, and gesture politics 
toward engagement with more serious, structural, and fundamental issues and have regarded this 
as a sign of the maturation of the protest movement. Against this, one must emphasize that the 
                                                 
1 A first version of this essay was presented at the thirty-first annual conference of the South African Visual Arts 
Historians hosted by the University of Johannesburg’s Faculty of Art, Design, and Architecture on July 29, 2016. 
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importance of the students’ cultural activism cannot be downplayed in such a way. It cannot be 
reduced to a sideshow or preliminary to current decolonial politics but, rather, makes up a vital 
component of it that is key to unlocking and sustaining radical passions for emancipation and 
social justice. 
At the same time, current decolonial cultural activism poses some formidable challenges—
practically as well as theoretically—due to its often extremist, violent, raw, destructive, 
implacable, and uncompromising forms and strategies. With this, I refer to by now trademark 
actions such as vandalizing and destroying contentious cultural objects from the colonial and 
apartheid era, which occasion endless delight among their perpetrators. For supporters of the 
student movements’ causes, this makes it hard at times to endorse such actions and sentiments 
unreservedly, especially for those who also believe in the transformational political role of 
culture. Ambivalence here might be expressed variously as disagreement on the means and 
cultural-political strategies employed to reach the proclaimed ends, skepticism regarding the 
protest movement’s true intentions, or fear for the direction it is heading. 
No doubt, such discomfort reached a climax with the theatrical burning of twenty or so 
paintings taken from several of UCT’s residences and other buildings by student protesters on 
February 16, 2016, an event with which I shall primarily engage in this article. This action was 
met with near unanimous incomprehension, indignation, and condemnation among 
commentators from across the political spectrum. Especially hard to digest for those sympathetic 
to the student movement was the fact that several paintings by a black South African artist, 
Keresemose Richard Baholo, were burnt seemingly indiscriminately with your typical, 
institutional portraits of university dignitaries. This happened despite the clear anti-apartheid 
theme of Baholo’s work, namely, protests in the early 1990s at UCT against interference by the 
apartheid state in the university’s affairs and tertiary education in general. For instance, one of 
the destroyed paintings, titled The Extinguished Torch of Academic Freedom (1993), is a 
somewhat expressionist rendering of a protesting crowd holding up placards with slogans such as 
“Forward to people’s education,” “Education is a right not a privilege” and “Phansi [down with] 
de Klerk bills of education,” all set against the iconic frontispiece of UCT’s Jameson Hall. The 
fact that Baholo also turned out to be the first black student to receive a master’s degree in fine 
art at UCT further added to the embarrassment. 
The perceived irony or even tragedy was the occasion for much schadenfreude on social 
and mainstream media. For others, it set alarm bells ringing as it conjured up chilling images of 
the troubling fate of art at the hands of extremist movements past and present, from German 
Nazis to the Muslim fundamentalist organization Islamic State. As such, the art burning could be 
seen to have functioned as a kind of litmus test, especially for liberal, progressive-minded 
supporters of current student protest movements. 
I propose to capture those features of current decolonial cultural activism that are generally 
regarded as most troublesome by both critics and sympathizers—if not incomprehensible and 
inexcusable—under the heading of philistinism, in its dictionary meaning as hostility or 
indifference toward art and culture, often due to a lack of sensibility or understanding. 
Consequently, I shall also speak of the philistine tendency of contemporary decolonial cultural 
activism in South Africa. The term philistinism will thus be used as shorthand for predominantly 
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derogatory depictions in the media and society at large of cultural-political acts of student 
protesters—such as the burning of artworks—as barbaric, savage, primitive, uncultured, crass, 
vulgar, simpleminded, and so on. 
My own deployment of the label of philistinism, however, is nonpejorative since the main 
aim of this article is to offer an affirmative reading of decolonial cultural activism’s philistine 
features or, still, to reappropriate this stigmatic term in a more positive, critical sense. In a way, 
such an approach is meant as a counterpoise to attempts at steering current decolonial student 
activism in allegedly more constructive directions by pleading for more mediated, complex, or 
sublimated strategies of cultural contestation. I hold this to be a dominant reflex among 
conservative and progressive cultural theorists and commentators alike. Although such attempts 
are neither illegitimate nor unproductive, my contention is that they move away too quickly from 
not only what is most specific to contemporary decolonial cultural contestations—for example, 
their rawness, confrontationality, and destructiveness—but also what makes them so effective in 
shaking up the status quo, disrupting business as usual, and unleashing radical political passions. 
In contrast, my approach can be seen to attempt to “tarry with the negativity” of decolonial 
cultural activism—to borrow an expression from Slavoj Žižek (1993), which he himself 
borrowed from Hegel’s philosophy—to arrive at a more measured appreciation of its 
motivations, significance, and validity. 
Lastly, I should also mention from the outset that my choice for the term philistinism is to a 
large degree prompted by the central place it occupies in Fredric Jameson’s important 
interpretation of Theodor Adorno’s theories of art, culture, and aesthetics in his Late Marxism 
(1990). Of utmost importance for the aims of this article is the way in which Jameson, following 
Adorno, offers a more dialectical, critical, and redemptive conceptualization of the relation 
between philistinism and the sphere of art and culture. A close reading, analysis, and 
interpretation of the latter thus forms a key component of this article.2 
Section I begins by looking more closely into the art burnings at UCT and especially 
legitimations by those involved as well as commentators. I do so to differentiate and specify my 
own approach to these events. For the same purpose, I then discuss some dominant critiques 
leveled by progressive commentators focused on both the ethics (section II) and aesthetics 
(section III) of contemporary decolonial cultural politics, as well as proposals for more desirable 
and effective strategies of aesthetic contestation and decolonization. After formulating my 
reservations regarding such responses and staking out my own position (section IV), sections V 
and VI turn to Jameson’s theorization of the philistine referred to earlier. In conclusion, I use the 
latter to suggest an alternative, more appropriate analytical, interpretative, and evaluative 
framework for contemporary decolonial cultural politics in South Africa, especially with regard 
to its most discomforting, indigestible aspects. 
                                                 
2 To be sure, it would have been extremely interesting and valuable to also include consideration, comparison, and 
discussion of different theorizations of similar contemporary processes and phenomena—popular rage, anger, 
discontent, extremism, resentment, and so on—around the globe. One can think here of works by Peter Sloterdijk 
(2010), Alain Badiou (2012), and Slavoj Žižek (2008). Apart from the fact that this would constitute a study on its 
own, I use mainly Jameson’s work because of its specific focus on the cultural and aesthetic manifestations of such 
phenomena, as well as its explicit linkage to art as social practice. 
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I. Legitimating the Burning of Art: Vulgar Materialism, the Politics of 
Representation, and Institutional Critiques of Art 
For purposes of contextualization I first take a closer look into the art burnings at UCT and some 
of the key responses to them, both favorable and critical, beginning with the former. Student 
protests on the day of the burnings started off with discontent with the university’s allegedly 
insufficient housing accommodation for poor, predominantly black students, although the day 
was also characterized more generally by protesters as a “day of rage” (Pather 2016). The 
destruction of paintings was closely associated with student housing issues, however. As Dudu 
Ndlovu, one of the protesters, put it: “You go into that residence, and you see the audacity of the 
university to not only not give you res [residence], but to have millions of rands worth of artwork 
and commemoration of white people who have put you in this position” (quoted in Pather 2016). 
This position can be understood as one of both poverty and cultural marginality. 
In this statement, which is one of the most direct expressions by student protesters of their 
motives, one can detect two types of reasoning. The first can be described as materialist, of a 
vulgar kind perhaps. It concerns criticism of the university’s spending on artworks, which is 
regarded as luxury in a context where students—including those living in the residences where 
these works are displayed—are struggling to make ends meet. The second legitimation might be 
characterized in terms of the politics of representation. Here, focus goes beyond the artworks’ 
monetary value and instead centers on their subject matter—say, predominantly white persons 
from the university elite or benefactors—as well as the works’ institutional functions, for 
example, glorification of such persons as instantiations of a mostly Western-style university 
system and its key values. The objection then is that all this is at odds with legitimate demands 
for a decolonized and “Africanized” university and society. From both perspectives, the 
paintings can be seen to constitute insults to poor, nonwhite students that warrant, if not their 
destruction, then at least contestation. 
The second type of justification features prominently in what is no doubt one of the most 
ardent defenses of the art burnings by South African playwright and art policy specialist Mike 
van Graan (2016). Against the barrage of public outcry and condemnation, van Graan defends 
attacks by RMF activists on “colonial symbols” by identifying “cultural practices” and “the arts” 
as important forms of “soft power” that “inculcate values, nurture ways of seeing or interpreting 
the world, introduce and consolidate belief systems.” Moreover, he holds that the latter is done 
mostly as a way for dominant groups in society to “celebrate political victories and to assert 
political hegemony in public spaces.” For van Graan, this constitutes an important facet of the 
political nature of art, which necessitates a series of critical questions to be asked about both 
artworks’ content and institutional embedment. Such questions include: “Who selected the 
works? For what purpose? Whose stories do they tell? For whom? Who had the means to create 
and distribute the work? Who has the means to access such work? What do these works say to, 
or mean for, people who may not share the historical, cultural, economic or educational 
backgrounds of the artists?” The latter list includes both key concerns of the politics of 
representation and the by now familiar problematics of institutional critiques of art. Van Graan 
argues that, by neglecting such questions, the psychological, emotional, and intellectual violence 
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underpinning colonialist artworks mostly remains under the radar of critics of RMF, which 
results in narrow focus on the literal, physical aspect of acts of destruction. 
Although these arguments are all relevant and valid, I want to probe a bit deeper and move 
to a less obvious level of analysis, explication, and legitimation of destructive behavior toward 
art that I deem to be more appropriate to the case at hand. One can ask, for instance, whether the 
defenses stated above account sufficiently, if at all, for the destruction of Baholo’s paintings, 
which, at least in terms of subject matter and aim, seem to be exemplary instances of the kind of 
questioning and contestation central to the politics of representation and institutional critiques of 
art. 
Having said this, it is not impossible to justify hostility toward Baholo’s paintings from the 
two identified perspectives. For instance, display of the artworks could be unmasked as a 
cunning strategy of self-legitimation and diversion on the part of UCT. By including artworks 
critical of its past as a university in cahoots with the apartheid state—and, according to RMF 
activists, still largely unreformed in this regard—it can present itself as an enlightened institution 
that facilitates and encourages self-criticism, as well as defuse allegations by student protesters 
of covertly continuing dubious, neocolonial or neoapartheid practices. Still, apart from being 
rather conspirational, such critique can hardly serve as an indictment of Baholo’s work. At most, 
it shows up the possibility of problematic institutionalizations or, still, the perverse ways in 
which it could be turned into a token of the university’s political progressiveness. 
In terms of more properly accounting for the destruction of Baholo’s paintings, materialist 
justifications are limited in a similar way. From this perspective, the paintings can be regarded as 
unaffordable luxury in the face of chronic underfunding of poor university students, 
notwithstanding their progressive content. Although one might wonder how much UCT actually 
spent on Baholo’s works, for materialist cultural critics the importance awarded to and diligence 
expended by the university in selecting, acquiring, and exhibiting them will undoubtedly be 
regarded as misspending of precious time and energy. Although the terms of materialist 
criticisms are wide enough to be able to account for the attacks on Baholo’s work, they might be 
too much so. They become general objections against the misspending by universities of 
precious resources, unable to explain the deep-seated anger against art more specifically. 
Against such attempts at explanation, the burning of Baholo’s work can of course also be 
regarded more matter-of-factly as an unfortunate accident or an instance of collateral damage, as 
some of those involved have claimed (Pather 2016). Even so, such an account might still seem 
somewhat odd considering the fact that some of the protesters were all but art ignoramuses, as 
pointed out by van Graan (2016). To be sure, what really went through the students’ heads or 
what their true motivations were when destroying Baholo’s paintings is impossible to determine 
and might even have been obscure to the students themselves. 
What I want to focus on in terms of interpretative work, rather, is the carelessness and 
nonchalance with which the UCT art burnings were conducted, that is, the way in which 
paintings were lumped together and tarred with the same brush in a paroxysmal outburst of rage, 
all equally turned into objects of passionate hatred and destructive lust. What I find significant, 
in other words, is that despite the fact that at least some of the participants could not, in principle, 
have been ignorant or insensitive to the political and artistic value of Baholo’s work—which, all 
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in all, is a rather straightforward form of artistic social critique—it became collateral damage 
nonetheless. I take this to be symptomatic of a more generic, generalized suspicion of and 
aversion to art typical of contemporary radical decolonial politics that, although not without its 
problematic aspects, is not entirely invalid either and can therefore not simply be dismissed, as I 
argue later on. 
II. The Means Undermine the Ends 
Before I start to theorize this deeper hatred of art, I want to consider some critical responses to 
the radical cultural politics applied by the RMF movement by those who nevertheless support 
some of the larger causes. This is crucial in order to specify my own approach, which can be 
seen to go into a direction opposite to such responses. 
In one way, the most common objections here follow well-rehearsed critiques of utilitarian 
modes of action and crucially concern the relation between means and ends. The fundamental 
reproach is that, in resorting to the destruction of artworks and monuments, protesters are 
employing counterproductive, even self-defeating strategies to achieve their decolonial aims. As 
one example among many, one can think of the condemnatory statement by Fritha Langerman 
(2016), director of UCT’s Michaelis School of Fine Art, with regard to the art burnings at UCT. 
While underlining her support for the students’ struggle for equal opportunities to tertiary 
education, Langerman criticizes the destruction of artworks, and those by Baholo in particular, 
for its impoverishing effects on society as a whole, including the activist movement itself. The 
reasons given include the exemplarity of Baholo as UCT’s first black master’s graduate in fine 
art, the importance of his works as “part of a valuable archive of a period in our collective 
histories,” and their active use in decolonizing art education at the university.3 
In more general terms, one can here detect a key concern with utilitarian, ends-justifying-
the-means types of reasoning, as encapsulated, for instance, in the radical’s tough talk that one 
cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs.4 Against this, it is emphasized that the means are 
not merely means to an end but in fact have a serious impact on the latter. It is argued that one 
should be extremely cautious in employing dubious tactics to achieve one’s goals because of 
their very real effects on the latter. The means are thought to shape and determine the desired end 
state to a large degree, to set the tone for the future society, with the means having the odd 
tendency to get in the way of, or even take the place of, the ends. 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, Baholo’s own response to the destruction of his work expresses the same critique of “legitimate ends 
yet flawed means.” He regretted the resort to violence and the irreversible loss of his works, while maintaining 
unwavering support for the student protest movement (Pather 2016). However, he did prove to be rather 
understanding about the violence employed, stating that “the [student’s] rage [at lack of transformation at UCT] is 
. . . growing to a point where people are beginning to see that it looks like the non-violent approach does not seem to 
be working” (Pather 2016). 
4 To be sure, such anti-utilitarian objections are somewhat usual subjects in discussions of anticolonial (cultural) 
politics and usually focus on the issue of the legitimate use of violence. The latter has dominated such debates ever 
since Frantz Fanon’s (2004) infamous, yet mostly superficially and one-dimensionally understood, treatment of the 
subject. 
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Applied to the case under consideration, it might thus be argued that sacrificing art for the 
larger purpose of achieving a fully transformed, decolonized university runs the risk that, once 
the latter is achieved, it will be an aesthetically impoverished, artless environment that lacks in 
creativity, imagination, and sensory richness. It could establish behavioral patterns and 
attitudes—hostility against art, aesthetic insensitivity, cultural barbarism—that might prove to be 
difficult to reverse after the revolution. 
To be sure, such critiques rest heavily on the presupposition of the value, if not 
autonomous status, of art. Although the latter wasn’t necessarily conceived in absolute terms—
think of Langerman’s reasoned defense of the value of Baholo’s work mentioned earlier—some 
commentators tended to do so and treated art as somehow sanctimonious, untouchable, 
inherently valuable. Take, for instance, commentator Bruce Gorton’s (2016) blunt proclamation 
to “value art more highly than the students who burnt it.” 
III. Progressive Resublimation as Antidote to Repressive Desublimation? 
Reservations among sympathizers of current decolonial student protests concern not only its 
ethics, however, but also its aesthetics, although both dimensions are strongly linked. The focus 
here shifts to closer scrutiny of the dominant cultural-political procedures of contestation 
employed by activists, as well as suggestions of more effective and desirable procedures than the 
prevailing slash-and-burn, take-no-prisoners ones. This mostly involves proposals for more 
nuanced, complex, and prudent strategies of cultural decolonization. The latter typically include 
ludic, satirical, parodic, subversive, archival, and allegorical modes of cultural contestation. The 
key purposes of decolonial cultural work are here defined in terms of reappropriating, reworking, 
rereading, reconstructing, resignifying, and repurposing cultural artifacts (see, e.g., Pillay 2015). 
Exemplary in this regard is a presentation by South African art historian Brenda 
Schmahmann (2016). In response to the removal of the Rhodes statue at UCT, she offers a plea 
for contesting cultural artifacts tainted by histories of slavery, colonialism, or apartheid in ways 
other than acts of vandalism, destruction, or removal. For inspiration, she turns to a series of art 
interventions done on the occasion of the annual Heritage Day celebrations in South Africa in 
Capetown in 1999 (see Penfold 1999).5 Nearly all of these involved re- or misappropriations of 
contested public statues and monuments, typically using humor—mostly light-hearted but at 
times also with a darker tone—to deliver a critical message. Think of two statues of Boer 
generals dressed up, respectively, as Xhosa initiate (Beeze Bailey) and Cape Carnival participant 
(Roderick Saul). In the same vein, the infamous statue of Cecile Rhodes at UCT was kitted out 
as a fan of the popular South African soccer team Kaiser Chiefs (Kultural Upstarts Kollective), 
while another work consisted of the placement of metal cages around the two iconic lion statues 
at Capetown’s Rhodes Memorial together with a banner stating “From rape to curio” (Brendhan 
Dickerson). Other works can be seen to employ archival (Kevin Brand, Roderick Sauls) and 
allegorical (John Nankin, Randy Hartzenberg) critical strategies. According to Schmahmann, 
                                                 
5 The works formed part of the Heritage Day Public Sculpture Intervention Project organized by artist organization 
Public Eye and coordinated by Kevin Brand and Brett Murray. 
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these diverse interventions exemplify effective ways to diminish or even undo what she calls the 
“persuasiveness” of contentious sculptures and monuments without resorting to their destruction 
or removal. 
In contrast, the contestational strategies of decolonial activists must appear as rather crude, 
simplistic, even obscene. In case of the statue of Rhodes on UCT’s campus, for example, action 
involved pulling a refuse bag over Rhodes’s head (as would be done to a torture victim), spray-
painting explicit slogans on its base such as “fuck your dream of empire,” smearing it with paint, 
and pouring urine and feces over it, all to the point that physical removal of the statue was 
considered to be inevitable by university management. In light of the art interventions listed 
above, such acts will no doubt come across as rather unrefined and blunt tools to contest the links 
between (neo)colonial power, privilege, and cultural representation. 
It might even be tempting to apply Herbert Marcuse’s (2002) famous notion of repressive 
desublimation to characterize and critique the cultural tactics employed by decolonial activists. 
In the resort to vulgar, one-dimensional acts and the invocation of raw, unchanneled, 
instantaneous affects (disgust, anger, rage, etc.), these tactics could be viewed as thoroughly 
desublimated and desublimating. In line with Marcuse’s theory, one could further argue that, 
while seemingly liberating, such an approach in fact generates repressive effects by eliminating 
and reducing key human potentials and dimensions such as play, creativity, dialogue, ambiguity, 
and multiplicity. Still within this framework, suggestions of more playful and complex modes of 
cultural contestation—such as those highlighted by Schmahmann—could then be regarded as 
attempts at facilitating what one might call a progressive resublimation of decolonial activism. 
The issue at stake here is about more than a clash of different tastes or preferences for 
cultural repertoires—say, more base and violent versus refined and playful ones. A key part of 
Schmahmann’s argument is that predominant, radical strategies of cultural decolonization are 
ultimately self-defeating because their iconoclastic gestures owe their critical force, if not their 
possibility, to preservation of the targeted objects. She makes this point, for instance, with regard 
to the Capetonian activist art ensemble Tokolos Stencil Collective and its trademark practice of 
spray-painting confrontational, often obscene slogans and images on contentious monuments or 
places—think of texts such as “non-poor only” or “fuck da police.” Granted, the latter in itself 
have little critical effect apart from their apt, strategic application. They owe their subversive 
potential to the aesthetic contrast and semantic interplay they create with the object or place of 
application, such as art galleries or university buildings. But then again, it is likely that the 
Tokolos Stencil Collective would gladly accept their graffiti’s loss of subversiveness or even 
superfluousness if this was due to the permanent eradication of the targeted monuments and 
institutions. Indeed, the latter will undoubtedly be celebrated as a victory. 
To be sure, any such thinking in terms of permanent, “final” solutions will be discarded as 
undesirable by Schmahmann. Another crucial component of her argument is that the 
interpretation and valuation of cultural objects are ambivalent and ever-changing processes 
because their meaning and significance, including their political evaluation, differ not only 
between groups in society but also through time. This can be seen to entail a pluralist and 
historicist view of cultural artifacts and another key argument against their removal or 
destruction based on the negative, partisan interpretation of one particular section of society at 
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one particular moment in time. This testifies to a rather different perspective on societal change 
and cultural contestation, one that is pluralist, revisionary, and processual as opposed to militant, 
radical, and goal oriented, which can be regarded as dominant within current decolonial 
movements. From the latter’s point of view, however, it will surely be asked in what time and by 
which section of society mystificatory statues from the colonial and apartheid past, such as the 
Rhodes statue at UCT, would be more positively evaluated so as to warrant their preservation, if 
not by apologists and nostalgists of those eras. 
Moreover, against accusations of the self-defeating logic of dominant decolonial cultural 
politics, some commentators have inversely reproached more refined forms of cultural 
contestation of gross inefficacy, as art historian Anitra Nettleton has done in response to 
Schmahmann’s presentation. According to her, all the inventive and subversive reappropriations 
of problematic monuments past and present have not been able to prevent the very same types of 
dubious monuments from being erected over and again. In this department, of course, the radical 
cultural strategies of current decolonial movements have proved much more successful. 
But again, for Schmahmann it is precisely not a question of which approach is more 
effective in having contentious cultural artifacts removed. On the contrary, in line with her 
pluralist perspective, she precisely opposes the equation of success with such removal. Still, 
despite Nettleton’s perhaps somewhat overgeneralizing and cynical viewpoint, it does point to an 
important limitation of the kind of politico-artistic strategies Schmahmann promotes as more 
constructive. They threaten to lock the cultural politics of contestation into a vicious cycle of 
interdependence between the existing order and its subversion. Indeed, the interventions listed 
earlier can all be seen to subscribe to the paradigm of the carnivalesque. They reverse the 
dominant order or evoke its obscene, dark, repressed side, yet although they thereby suspend, 
demystify, or embarrass the latter’s authority, this operation remains an occurrence limited in 
space, time, and implications. Žižek (1999), for one, has argued that such acts might ultimately 
end up affirming the existing order more than contributing to the latter’s subversion and the 
establishment of a new order, if only because they offer temporary relief from a deficient order, 
thereby making its continued existence bearable.6 
In relation to Schmahmann’s argument that cultural acts of decolonial subversion owe their 
strength and possibility to the physical persistence of their target, one thus has to beware of the 
obverse side, namely, the cunning, sinister way in which contested objects retain and even 
increase their legitimacy through acts of desecration, by way of a type of blackmail that argues 
that it would be undesirable to destroy or remove them because it would make countercultural 
contestation impossible.7 This is, of course, to put the cart before the horse since such radical 
cultural acts are precisely what current decolonial movements call for. 
                                                 
6 One can also think of Umberto Eco’s (1984: 6) similar, earlier critique of carnival in terms of “authorized 
transgression.” 
7 There are, of course, other arguments in favor of preservation of contentious monuments, the most prominent and 
recurring of which is no doubt that they act as painful reminders of problematic past events and thereby as warning 
signs for future generations (see, e.g., Barnard-Naudé 2015). Within such a view, destruction or removal of 
monuments is bound to lead to the eternal return of past evils. For a powerful argument against the alleged 
fetishization of historical memory as panacea or condition sine qua non for the prevention of repetitions of the 
mistakes of history, see Rieff 2016. 
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IV. Aesthetically Uplifting the Decolonial Philistine? No Thanks 
Behind pleas for progressive resublimation, one could detect a grave concern, not to say panic 
and disillusion, among progressive theorists of art and culture. Especially to those supportive of 
current decolonial politics, the sheer enjoyment derived from the destruction of cultural objects, 
as well as the seeming thoughtlessness with which it is executed—with even anti-apartheid 
protest art not safe—must fly in the face of the hard-felt conviction in the vital mediatory role of 
art and culture in facilitating a more constructive exit strategy from South Africa’s troubled past 
and present. It surely must leave everyone passionate about the politically progressive role of art 
bamboozled in the face of such radical aggression and make them eager to draw attention to 
assumedly more legitimate and productive modes of cultural contestation. 
To be clear, I am not claiming that such concerns are wholly unwarranted or that the 
proposed politico-aesthetic strategies are not valuable or powerful in their own right, although it 
needs to be said that it mostly involves cultural procedures that have attained a certain canonical 
status, which makes them more safely defensible theoretically, as well as sanctioned socially. My 
real reservation, however, concerns too hasty rejection of, and nonreflexive unease with, acts of 
aggression toward art and the ensuing desire to shift the terms of investigation, debate, and 
action as quickly and as far as possible away from such acts. In this regard, one might speculate 
whether progressive cultural critics do not concede too much to conservative fears, as well as 
public outcry. In doing so, they run the danger of exerting mechanisms of othering, exclusion, 
and externalization in response to violent acts against art. Moreover, they also threaten to lapse 
into a prescriptive, patronizing, self-righteous, reprimanding discourse on, and mode of 
interaction with, current decolonial movements, as if undertaking to uplift the latter aesthetically. 
In contrast, I want to dwell longer on and take more seriously the raw, destructive passion 
directed at art by contemporary decolonial movements. I contend that cultural acts of 
contemporary decolonial activism, precisely in their philistinism, contain something of critical 
importance to theoretical reflection. They aptly expose and tackle the structural complicity and 
historical guilt of art and culture in the constitution and perpetuation of social, cultural, and—
specifically in South Africa but also other post- or neocolonial settings—racial division. As such, 
acts of hatred toward art should be seized upon by people working in the field of art and culture 
as opportunities for sober, profound, self-critical introspection. This is not to say that this is the 
only correct or important avenue for theoretical reflection in response to current, radical forms of 
cultural contestation. I do, however, feel that such perspective has been lacking, which might 
result in an unfortunate disconnect between cultural-theoretical reflection and revolutionary 
practice. 
To fill this lacuna, I now turn to Fredric Jameson’s Late Marxism (1990), in which he 
offers an interpretation of some of the major components of the work of Theodor Adorno, 
including his aesthetic theory. I am particularly interested in a crucial aspect of Jameson’s 
reading, namely, the focus on the presence in Adorno’s writings on art and aesthetics of the 
latter’s “negative” or “opposite,” or, personified, their others and enemies (151).8 I am intrigued 
here by the way in which Jameson explicates the dialectical relations between art and its 
                                                 
8 Jameson does this in part 2 of Late Marxism, titled “Parable of the Oarsmen” (1990: 121–54). 
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negations, especially since the latter are understood in a nonpejorative, dialectical sense. In the 
concluding section, I use some of Jameson’s insights to propose a less dismissive approach to 
philistine acts of current decolonial movements. 
V. Fredric Jameson and the Others of Art in Adorno’s Thought on Art and 
Culture 
No doubt, mere mention of Adorno’s cultural and aesthetic theory in the context of current 
decolonial movements will appear to many as wholly misguided, taking into account his 
reputation as ultimate philosophical advocate of high modernist, autonomous art. The latter 
seems completely at odds with the anti-aesthetic, anti-elitist cultural strategies and sensibilities 
characteristic of contemporary South African student activists. Even a superficial reading, 
however, quickly complicates, if not dispels, such commonplace perception of Adorno’s 
position. His work on art and aesthetics displays an unmatched dialectical subtlety and 
restlessness that refuse to validate the claims and value of autonomous, “high” art or even of art 
as such. 
In-depth treatment of the latter would go beyond the scope and purpose of this article. As 
said, I shall focus on the way in which Jameson (1990: 151) not only places great interpretative 
importance on the dialectical positioning of art toward its “oppositional terms” for a profound 
understanding of Adorno’s thinking on art and culture but also differentiates between three 
different types of art’s others in Adorno’s writings. The originality of Jameson’s interpretation 
lies in the way in which he draws together scattered and allusive remarks and claims in Adorno’s 
notoriously dense, fragmentary writing and systematizes their interrelations. I focus mainly on 
Jameson’s interpretation of one of these others that is most relevant to this article, which he 
denotes by the term philistines. For a good understanding, however, it is key to conceive of the 
way in which this position differs from and relates to art’s two other others. 
First, with the term nonart, Jameson refers to what Adorno (2004: 160) calls “those alien to 
art” or, still, “those with no feeling for it.” This refers to people deprived of aesthetic sensibilities 
or, as Jameson (1990: 151) puts it, the “absence of art altogether.” Important here is the way in 
which Jameson links this position to another key notion of Adorno’s aesthetic theory: the guilt of 
art. In brief, this connection can be understood as follows. The alienness to art referred to is not 
to be regarded as a natural propensity or condition of some groups in society. Rather, it is 
thought to be the outcome of the modern process of class differentiation and division, for which 
a famous episode in Homer’s The Odyssey (book XII) serves as allegorical reference. It concerns 
the story of how the Greek mythical hero Odysseus safely guided his crew of oarsmen and 
himself past the irresistibly seductive yet lethal songs of creatures called Sirens. As is well 
known, Odysseus had wax poured in the ears of his oarsmen so that they were unable to hear the 
Sirens’ songs and would therefore continue to row without distraction. Further, he had himself 
tied to the mast so that he could enjoy the songs while being prevented from acting on their 
seductive power. 
Jameson (1990: 129) identifies this story—the interpretation of which features centrally in 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972)—as the “primal myth” of 
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Adorno’s aesthetic theory. As Adorno and Horkheimer (1972: 34) put it, the story narrates the 
splitting of “art appreciation and manual work.” The two terms of this division are represented 
by the “social role[s]” of, on the one hand, Odysseus, the “feudal baron” who is able to enjoy the 
“beauty” of the Sirens’ songs, as well as their “allurement” of happiness, yet can only do so 
divorced from “praxis” and “without consequence,” since the songs are “neutralized,” having 
become “a mere object of contemplation” or “Art itself.” This is contrasted with the position of 
the oarsmen, the “workers,” whose “impulse to diversion” by art and beauty they “must 
doggedly sublimate, through redoubled effort” and who thereby “come to incarnate the practical 
realm.” For Jameson (1990: 130), this division is said to constitute “the sheer guilt of Art itself in 
a class society, art as luxury and class privilege,” which he holds to be a “ground bass” in 
Adorno’s aesthetic theory. 
Relevant for my argument is not so much an orthodox, Marxian reading of this process of 
division of manual and intellectual labor as an effect of the dominant mode of production and 
relations between economic classes such as landed nobility, bourgeoisie, and proletariat. Rather, 
I interpret it in line with Jacques Rancière’s (1999, 2004, 2009) key notion of the partitioning of 
the sensible—le partage du sensible in the original French. This is a quite complex, rich, and 
versatile concept that in this context I take to refer to the differentiating, dissociating, and 
classifying of different groups of human beings based on the assumption of their different 
modalities of sensible capacity. The latter can range from those regarded as most developed, 
refined, or rational to those regarded less so, even entailing, in some instances, the denial of 
specifically human forms of sensibility to certain groups. For Rancière, the latter fate befell 
slaves or so-called barbarians in ancient societies, but one might just as well think of the status of 
enslaved and colonized, non-Western, native populations in the modern era to which a base, 
animal type of sensibility was attributed, receptive only to physical pain and sensual pleasure. 
Such distinctions, hierarchies, and exclusions on the level of sensible and aesthetic capacities—
both of production and of reception—then further serve as grounds for and legitimations of 
social and political processes of domination and marginalization. One could speak here of a 
relatively independent process of cultural or aesthetic class division that cannot be reduced to 
purely economic motivations and rationalities. This is an important point because, as I argue 
later, Jameson offers a rather narrow Marxian interpretation of philistinism that is too limiting 
with regard to the post- or neocolonial problematics discussed in this article. 
I shall be brief about the second other of art detected by Jameson in Adorno’s work, for 
which he employs the term anti-art. This is somewhat confusing because it refers neither to 
known anti-art practices—such as dada and the historical avant-gardes—nor to aggression 
toward art. Instead, it refers to “those who think they” possess aesthetic sensibility yet do so 
mistakenly (Jameson 1990: 137, my emphasis). This position is associated with Adorno’s 
famous notion of the culture industry and refers both to the latter’s products and to its “betrayed 
and victimized public” (151). 
Finally, let us look into Jameson’s (1990: 151) theorization of the third other of art, which 
is most relevant to this paper’s problematic: the philistines, presented as “a generalized negation 
of the other three terms”—that is, nonart, anti-art, and art itself. More specifically, the philistines 
are conceived neither as “those who passively consume mass culture, nor are they the oarsmen, 
PAUWELS - IN DEFENSE OF DECOLONIAL PHILISTINISM 
13 
who are deprived of the very sense organs for any culture, whether authentic or commercial, but 
rather those who carry in their hearts some deeper hatred of art itself” (152, my emphasis). 
Importantly, Jameson (1990: 152)—interpreting a brief, allusive passage in Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory (2004: 241)—emphasizes that “the philistines are not first and foremost . . . those who do 
not ‘understand’ art or, better still, who do not ‘understand’ modern art; rather, they understand it 
only too well.” Interestingly, Jameson also offers a chronological account of the three positions 
by distinguishing among “those who are initially excluded (Odysseus’s crew), those who come 
to demand pleasure in the place of what they have been excluded from (the public of the Culture 
Industry), and finally those who, more keenly aware of the whole process (and of what Odysseus 
is able to hear), conceive a more generalized reaction to it” (1990: 152). Finally, Jameson 
identifies this reaction with “none other than the great figure of ressentiment,” an obvious 
reference to Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy (152). 
One could connect some of these determinations and say that what philistines come to 
resent is what they understand all too clearly about art, that is, not only what was previously 
discussed in terms of the guilt of art as social phenomenon and activity but also—and this is 
another key component of Adorno’s aesthetic theory and Jameson’s interpretation—the way in 
which individual artworks “engage this universal sense of guilt, . . . address it with lacerating 
acuity, . . . bring it to consciousness in the form of an unresolvable contradiction” (Jameson 
1990: 130). Important here is a central theme in Adorno’s aesthetic theory, namely, the promise 
of happiness contained in art that is held to be, as Jameson puts it, art’s “deepest vocation” (153). 
In line with the divorce between art appreciation and manual labor dealt with earlier, this 
promise of art must of necessity remain “inconsequential” due to art’s exclusion from the 
practical sphere (132). For Adorno, art’s inability to realize happiness was considered to be 
insurmountable without a fundamental change of existing social divisions to which art cannot 
contribute much, being irremediably divorced from revolutionary praxis that alone is thought to 
be able to force such a change. 
Despite these limiting conditions, however, Adorno did believe that there was an authentic 
way for art to relate to the impossible realization of its promise of happiness, namely, through the 
paradoxical attempt to “keep . . . faith with [happiness] . . . by negation and suffering, through 
the enactment of its impossibility,” as Jameson (1990: 147) sums it up. Or still, art is called upon 
to take on “the form of [its] . . . ‘broken promise’, which keeps the idea of happiness alive at the 
moment of denying its present existence” (147). Despite the inability to resolve the 
contradictions caused by social divisions in which it is deeply implicated, artworks are thus 
thought to be able to “recover a certain authenticity by including it [the universal guilt of art] as 
content and raw material, as what [they] must always confront anew, in all its virulence” (130). 
As is well known, Adorno specifically presented late-modern artworks—such as Arnold 
Schönberg’s atonal musical compositions or Samuel Beckett’s dissociative novels and plays—as 
exemplary of a self-critical, authentic way of dealing with the structural complicity and 
impotence of art in deeply divided modern societies. 
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VI. A Redemptive Reading of the Anti-Semite’s Rage against the Idea of 
Happiness 
Finally, another important component of Jameson’s theorization of philistinism needs to be 
addressed, one that is perhaps most controversial. It concerns the way in which Jameson further 
elaborates the key sources and structure of the philistines’ hatred of art through an interpretation 
of what he takes to be another social manifestation of philistinism in Adorno’s work. Somewhat 
surprisingly, it concerns the figure of the anti-Semite as Adorno analyzed it together with Max 
Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment. As is the case with Jameson’s conceptualization of 
the cultural philistine, here also, the crux of his reading is the “relationship to ‘happiness’ and . . . 
utopian fulfillment” which he finds to be fundamentally at play in anti-Semitism (Jameson 1990: 
153). 
Jameson bases his interpretation on a dense passage in which Adorno and Horkheimer 
(1972: 172) position the anti-Semite in relation to the universal rights of man and, specifically, 
its alleged purpose of “promis[ing] happiness even to those without power.” This situation of 
having rights without possessing political power is then epitomized by the historical fate and 
societal position of Jews. It reflects the fact that, regarded as an alien population by their host 
communities, they are excluded from participation in the latter’s political life yet, in many 
instances, are nevertheless granted certain civil rights—even if often unofficially—such as the 
right to conduct business. Jews can then be said to have made a virtue out of necessity by 
achieving high levels of individual and collective happiness solely through trade and commerce, 
outside political circuits of power. 
Adorno and Horkheimer (1972: 172) contend that this creates a sense of being cheated 
among the masses, which understand all too well—one might say, in analogy to Jameson’s 
expression with regard to aesthetic philistinism—that the happiness promised by the idea of 
universal rights “remains a lie as long as classes exist.” Discontent is thus directed at “powerless 
happiness,” because “the thought of happiness without power is unbearable, because only then 
[i.e., in a society devoid of power struggles between different classes] would it be true 
happiness” (172). This would cause the anti-Semite to repress the promise of happiness not only 
in its exemplary social embodiment in the prosperity of the Jewish community but “even as a 
possibility, an idea” (172). For Jameson, the latter constitutes the deeply paradoxical logic of the 
anti-Semite’s relation to happiness whereby the latter is denied, as Adorno and Horkheimer put 
it, “ever more passionately the more imminent it seems. Wherever happiness seems to have been 
achieved in the midst of universal renunciation, they [the anti-Semites] must repeat that gesture 
of suppression which is really the suppression of their own longing” (172). 
What is striking about Jameson’s reading is that, rather than dismissing the anti-Semite’s 
resentment as regressive, autodestructive, or nihilistic, he detects a utopian dimension in it.9 At 
                                                 
9 To be sure, such a redemptive approach is a trademark feature of Jameson’s (2002: 286) strand of social and 
cultural theory. The key methodological injunction here is that in interpreting cultural products one has to 
simultaneously apply a negative and positive hermeneutic. That is, an “ideological analysis proper” must be 
conducted alongside “a decipherment of the Utopian impulses of these same ideological texts.” Or, as he also 
phrases it, “an instrumental analysis [has to be] coordinated with a collective-associational or communal reading of 
culture, . . . a functional method . . . [has to be] articulated with an anticipatory one” (286). 
PAUWELS - IN DEFENSE OF DECOLONIAL PHILISTINISM 
15 
least, this is how Jameson (1990: 153) interprets Adorno and Horkheimer’s theorization, which 
he lauds for offering an “extraordinary utopian analysis of anti-Semitism in terms of cultural 
envy.” According to Jameson, the latter “at least implicitly enlarg[es] this conception of a rage at 
the idea of happiness to include the envy for what is fantasized as the less alienated state of an 
older [i.e., classless] community or collectivity” (153). Jameson thus regards Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s diagnosis of anti-Semitism as “one of the most powerful and convincing,” because 
the position of the philistine—whether the anti-Semite in Nazi Germany or “the seemingly more 
benign figure of the philistine of the Culture Industry” in the US context—is understood as 
“negative embodiment . . . of the deeper ressentiment generated by class society itself” (154). As 
such, it is said to go beyond analyses that attribute anti-Semitism to “sheerly psychological and 
irrational impulses,” which Jameson finds limiting because they “thereby structurally consign . . . 
[it] to what is by definition incomprehensible” (154). 
How should one now interpret the rather summarily indicated resemblance between the 
social types of the anti-Semitic and cultural philistine? One could understand it so that art 
occupies a homologous position as the Jews, namely, that of “powerless happiness.” As 
discussed earlier, Adorno conceives of art as a practice in which the realization of happiness is, if 
not simulated, then at least promised and in this sense carries a utopian charge. We also saw, 
however, that this realization must remain a promise for structural reasons because art, being 
devoid from significant worldly power, cannot lift the obstacles that prevent such realization in 
existing societies, obstacles that Jameson identifies with the realities of power and class struggle. 
Even Adorno’s tortured and dissonant late modern artworks, with their more authentic, negative-
dialectical mode of relating to their impotence in regard to realizing happiness, cannot fully 
escape the guilt, as Adorno called it, connected to this impotence, as well as their complicity and 
entanglement in what I referred to as social and cultural processes of aesthetic division. As 
Jameson (1990: 154) phrases it in conclusion: “The valorization of art . . . finds its deeper 
function in precisely this diagnosis [of anti-Semitic and cultural philistinism], as the guilty and 
fragile place of a promise of social and personal happiness persisting within a social order 
deformed by class.” And it is due to the latter, one can add, that art engenders the suspicion and 
hatred of the philistine. 
Conclusion: The Utopian Dimension of Burning Anti-apartheid Art 
Let me now bring together the different threads of my argument regarding the philistine 
tendencies of contemporary decolonial movements in South Africa. In the Adornian-Jamesonian 
framework, the truth of philistinism crucially lies in its sobering insight into the guilt of art. As 
we saw, this guilt consists of the complicity of artistic activity in perpetuating class divisions. I 
have indicated that Jameson interprets art’s guilt in rather orthodox Marxian fashion in terms of 
economic class formation. Although I want to maintain the centrality of practices of 
classification and division as key sources of societal antagonism, injustice, and struggle, I have 
suggested an understanding of this guilt in terms other than those of narrow economist 
determinations, especially in view of the post/neocolonial context of the topic at hand. Rather, I 
read Adorno’s notion of the guilt of art in terms of its constitutive role in establishing and 
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maintaining aesthetic divisions, that is to say, distinctions and hierarchies between those who are 
presumed to be capable of art production and appreciation and those who are not, as well as the 
underlying presuppositions regarding such aesthetic capacities and noncapacities. To be sure, 
such divisions can be, and mostly are, coformed as and overdetermined by other economic, 
gender, racial, and colonial divisions. 
The philistine’s passionate anger can then be understood in line with such aesthetic 
divisions and distributions. Philistine acts, however raw and disconcerting, point to a 
fundamental truth of art as a social practice that is formed and limited by processes of division 
that it itself installs and operates and that constitutes its guilt, a guilt of which even, or precisely 
the most authentic, progressive forms can never fully absolve themselves. This can be 
understood in terms of what Jameson called the paradoxical logic of the philistine’s hatred of 
happiness, namely, the way in which this hatred is all the more passionate, the more successful 
the promise of happiness is maintained, which, in the case of Adorno’s late modern artworks, 
was done in a negative mode. Again, it might come as somewhat of a surprise that, according to 
this analysis, the philistine’s aggression against what Adorno defends philosophically as most 
authentic art would be partially justified within his conceptual framework. 
I now propose to use this redemptive reading of philistinism as theoretical opening to a 
different and arguably more positive and constructive way of analyzing, understanding, and 
evaluating the philistine gestures and tendencies of contemporary decolonial activism in South 
Africa. Such an approach departs from predominant, dismissive interpretations in terms of 
irrational, incomprehensible acts of sheer destruction, vandalism, delinquent behavior, or still, 
pathologies of either individuals (e.g., anger management issues, desublimation) or groups 
(collective frenzy, cult of the leader, sectarian violence, herd mentality). To be sure, this article 
can only be a preliminary to the articulation of the theoretical, empirical, and practical 
implications and potentialities unlocked by such an approach, with much fundamental work still 
to be done. 
I thus want to end, first, by using Jameson’s theorization of the philistines’ hatred of art as 
an alternative way of interpreting and evaluating this article’s central case, the burning of 
artworks by student protesters at UCT. Second, I shall point out at least one limitation of 
Jameson’s theorization with regard to its application and relevance to South Africa’s current 
post/neocolonial situation. 
First, in the cultural acts of contemporary decolonial movements in South Africa, one can 
easily detect the same “destructive lust” and even self-destructive behavior attributed by Adorno 
and Horkheimer (1972: 172) to the anti-Semite. Such behavior{Au: correct?} manifested itself most 
dramatically in the destruction of Baholo’s paintings, which can be seen to harbor the student 
activists’ very own desire for decolonization, as well as hold out a certain promise of happiness, 
to use Adorno’s terms, in their expression of and testament to the resilience of the human spirit 
in the face of oppression and injustice. Rather than a simple lapse of judgment on behalf of 
student activists at best, or a sinister precursor of the desert of decolonial philistinism lying ahead 
at worst, I take such destructive cultural acts to be motivated by a mostly intuitive insight into the 
irreparable guilt of art as a social activity, even of the critical or authentic kind, as well as a 
desire to expose the latter. No matter how solidarious with the students’ cause, as art Baholo’s 
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paintings are ultimately condemned to a position outside the sphere of practical, radical action. 
Their promise of human liberation will always remain inconsequential relative to radical social 
activism. Artistic practice, even of a progressive kind, cannot undo its status of relative luxury in 
the context of such struggle. The utopian element, as Jameson would put it, of contemporary 
decolonial cultural activism could then be located in the way in which it hints at a desire for the 
radical sublation of the divorce between art and revolutionary practice, over and against which 
most traditional forms of protest art—such as the type of critical social commentary of Baholo’s 
paintings—can be experienced as grossly inadequate and even unbearable in conditions of 
heightened revolutionary struggle. I regard such a redemptive reading to contest, and offer a 
corrective to, either absolute condemnations of the validity of extreme cultural acts of 
contestation by the student activists or avoidance of serious, direct theoretical engagement with 
them, without therefore being blind to their obvious problematic features. 
To be clear, the arguments put forward should not be taken as either absolute or blanket 
justifications for vandalizing or destroying art.10 They cannot, for instance, be mobilized 
unproblematically in support of other acts of destruction of cultural artifacts, such as those 
performed by the Nazi regime in the 1930s or, recently, by the Islamic State. Although a quick 
comparison is problematic, one important difference is that in these instances it is not so much a 
case of hatred of art as such—as a divided and divisive social phenomenon and activity—that 
forms the focus of the arguments regarding philistinism central to this article. Instead, specific 
types of cultural objects are targeted such as so-called degenerate, mostly modernist art in Nazi 
Germany—which is then contrasted with great German art—and, in the case of the Islamic State, 
monuments and buildings that do not adhere to a dogmatic interpretation of the aesthetico-
religious ideology of aniconism. Although I considered explanations of the attacks on artworks at 
UCT in somewhat similar terms—for example, based on their perceived status as colonial 
representations—the aim of this article is to articulate a less obvious dimension at play in such 
acts of destruction, namely, that of a deeper-lying discontent and disagreement caused by 
structural processes of cultural and aesthetic division. In this regard, moreover, I detected in the 
philistine acts of student protesters that contest such divisions a desire for a revolutionary 
practice in which art and politics, contemplation and action, creativity and activism are combined 
in more intrinsic, horizontal, egalitarian, and, I hope, effective ways, as opposed to the mere 
imposition of new aesthetic norms and exclusions in the case of the Nazis or the Islamic State. 
Finally, I must emphasize one important limitation of Jameson’s theorization of 
philistinism to the case at hand, one that I have already suggested: the focus on economic class. 
For sure, this is somewhat understandable considering the predominantly Western context and 
sources of his work. However, to unlock the full potential and consequences of his theory in 
postcolonial settings, with its principal problematics of race and coloniality, it is essential that 
                                                 
10 And, to be perfectly clear, neither does it justify anti-Semitic sentiments and Nazi sympathies expressed by certain 
elements within South Africa’s current student protest movement. What interests me in Jameson’s redemptive 
reading of Adorno and Horkheimer’s diagnosis of anti-Semitism, rather, is his conceptualization of the intolerant, 
envious, and destructive attitude toward projected illusions of the possible realization of happiness—in the aesthetic 
as well as political realm—in societal conditions in which it is perceived as structurally impossible. 
PAUWELS - IN DEFENSE OF DECOLONIAL PHILISTINISM 
18 
key analyses and notions, such as the guilt of art or art’s promise of happiness, are further 
specified, complicated, and expanded. 
Key to such work of contextual specification and translation are not only postcolonial 
critiques and deconstructions of the canon of Western philosophical aesthetics, which have 
already been undertaken (e.g., Spivak 1999). Also necessary—and ideally conducted 
simultaneously—is genealogical research into how the philistinism trope was and still is 
employed in colonial, postcolonial, and neocolonial contexts and sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular. The focus here should be not only on local differences but also on different forms of 
philistinization employed throughout the extensive encounter of the West with “the rest” (from 
slavery and colonialism to imperialism and apartheid). Here also, important work has also 
already been done (e.g., Gikandi 2011; Oguibe 2002). Context-specific histories of the 
problematic entanglements of art, aesthetics, and coloniality in constructions of the colonized as 
barbarian, crass, aesthetically disabled, uncivilized, and even uncivilizable beings are extremely 
important. They help us understand current animosities and radical contestations with regard to 
art and culture in post/neocolonial societies, such as the ones currently raging at South Africa’s 
universities, in relation to long-term historical processes and structures of cultural division. 
References 
Adorno, Theodor. 2004. Aesthetic Theory. Translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor. London: 
Continuum. 
Adorno, Theodor, and Max Horkheimer. 1972. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated by John 
Cumming. New York: Herder and Herder. 
Badiou, Alain. 2012. The Rebirth of History. Translated by Gregory Elliot. New York: Verso. 
Barnard-Naudé, Jaco. 2015. “Removing Rhodes’s Statue Would Not ‘Erase the Past’.” 
Thoughtleader, March 26, thoughtleader.co.za/jacobarnardnaude/2015/03/26/removing-
rhodes-statue-would-not-erase-the-past/. 
Eco, Umberto. 1984. “The Frames of Comic ‘Freedom’.” In Carnival!, edited by Thomas A. 
Sebeok, 1–10. Amsterdam: Mouton. 
Fanon, Frantz. 2004. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Hilcox. New York: 
Grove Press. 
Gikandi, Simon. 2011. Slavery and the Culture of Taste. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Gorton, Bruce. 2016. “Why I Value Art over Destructive Students.” Times Live, February 29, 
www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/2016/02/29/Why-I-value-art-over-destructive-students. 
Jameson, Fredric. 1990. Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic. New York: 
Verso. 
Jameson, Fredric. 2002. The Political Unconscious. London: Routledge. 
PAUWELS - IN DEFENSE OF DECOLONIAL PHILISTINISM 
19 
Langerman, Fritha. 2016. “On the Destruction of Art and the Loss of Collective Histories.” 
Politicsweb, February 18, politicsweb.co.za/politics/rmf-protesters-incinerated-five-
richard-baholo-pai. 
Marcuse, Herbert. 2002. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial 
Society. New York: Routledge. 
Oguibe, Olu. 2002. “Reverse Appropriation as Nationalism in Modern African Art.” In The 
Third Text Reader on Art, Culture, and Theory, edited by Rasheed Araeen, Sean Cubitt 
and Ziauddin Sardar,{Au: please name all editors.} 35–47. New York: Continuum. 
Pather, Ra’eesa. 2016. “Artist of Burnt Work Sides with Students.” Mail and Guardian, 
February 18, mg.co.za/article/2016-02-18-students-are-shackvilles-collateral-damage. 
Penfold, Denise. 1999. “P.T.O.—Public Monuments Reconsidered.” Artthrob, Contemporary Art 
in South Africa, October, artthrob.co.za/99oct/reviews.html. 
Pillay, Verashni. 2015. “More Useful to Redefine, Not Destroy, the Rhodes Statue.” Mail and 
Guardian, March 30, mg.co.za/article/2015-03-30-itd-be-more-useful-to-redefine-not-
destroy-the-rhodes-statue. 
Rancière, Jacques. 1999. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Rancière, Jacques. 2004. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. New York: 
Continuum. 
Rancière, Jacques. 2009. Aesthetics and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Rieff, David. 2016. In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Schmahmann, Brenda. 2016. “Public Sculptures of Cecil Rhodes and Decolonisation: Where to 
from Here?” Paper presented at the thirty-first annual conference of the South African 
Visual Arts Historians, University of Johannesburg, July 29. 
Sloterdijk, Peter. 2010. Rage and Time: A Psychopolitical Investigation. Translated by Mario 
Wenning. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1999. Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the 
Vanishing Present. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
van Graan, Mike. 2016. “Barbarism, Burnings, and Beckett 1: On Art, Statues, Language, and 
Other Burning Issues,” mikevangraan.wordpress.com, March 1, 
mikevangraan.wordpress.com/2016/03/01/barbarism-burnings-and-beckett-1/. 
Žižek, Slavoj. 1993. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Žižek, Slavoj. 1999. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: 
Verso. 
Žižek, Slavoj. 2008. Violence. New York: Picador. 
